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Abstract. We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E)
with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they
need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a
roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and we prove its NP-hardness
here. A sub-class of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been well-
studied in bipartite graphs. We show that the dominant matching problem in G = (V,E) is
also NP-hard and this is the case even when G admits a stable matching.
1 Introduction
We consider a matching problem in a graph G = (V,E) (need not be complete) where each vertex
u ∈ V ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Such a graph G is usually referred to as
a roommates instance. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to M , i.e.,
there is no pair (a, b) such that both a and b prefer each other to their respective assignments in M .
Stable matchings always exist when G is bipartite [6], however there are simple roommates
instances that do not admit any stable matching. The problem of deciding whether a stable match-
ing exists or not in G is the stable roommates problem. There are several polynomial time algo-
rithms [12,19,21] to solve the stable roommates problem. Here we consider a notion called popularity
that is more relaxed than stability.
1.1 Popular Matchings
The notion of popularity was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [7] in 1975. We say a vertex u prefers
matching M to matching M ′ if either (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in M ′ or (ii) u is
matched in both M,M ′ and u prefers M(u) to M ′(u). For any two matchings M and M ′, let
φ(M,M ′) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M ′.
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if φ(M,M ′) ≥ φ(M ′,M) for every matching M ′ in G,
i.e., ∆(M,M ′) ≥ 0 where ∆(M,M ′) = φ(M,M ′)− φ(M ′,M).
Thus there is no matching M ′ that would defeat a popular matching M in an election between M
and M ′, where each vertex casts a vote for the matching that it prefers. Since there is no matching
where more vertices are better-off than in a popular matching, a popular matching can be regarded
a “globally stable matching”.
It is easy to show that every stable matching is popular [7]. Since popularity is a relaxation of
stability, popular matchings may exist in roommates instances that admit no stable matchings (see
the instance on 4 vertices d0, d1, d2, d3 on the left of Fig. 1). Here we are interested in the complexity
of the popular roommates problem, i.e., the problem of deciding if G = (V,E) admits a popular
matching or not. This has been an open problem for almost a decade [2] and we show the following
result here.1
Theorem 1. Given a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists, the problem of
deciding if G admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard.
1 Very recently, this hardness result also appeared in [8] on the arxiv; our results were obtained independently
and our proofs are different.
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Popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, since stable matchings always exist here.
Popular matchings have been well-studied in bipartite graphs, in particular, a subclass of max-size
popular matchings called dominant matchings is well-understood [5,9,14].
Definition 2. A popular matching M is dominant in G if M is more popular than any larger
matching in G, i.e., ∆(M,M ′) > 0 for any matching M ′ such that |M ′| > |M |.
Dominant matchings always exist in a bipartite instance and such a matching can be computed
in linear time [14]. We consider the dominant matching problem in a roommates instance and show
the following result.
Theorem 2. Given a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists, the problem of
deciding if G admits a dominant matching or not is NP-hard. Moreover, this hardness holds even
when G admits a stable matching.
1.2 Background and Related work
The first polynomial time algorithm for the stable roommates problem was by Irving [12] in 1985.
A characterization of roommates instances that admit stable matchings was given in [20] and new
polynomial time algorithms for the stable roommates problem were given in [19,21]. As mentioned
earlier, Ga¨rdenfors [7] introduced the notion of popularity in the stable matching problem in bipartite
instances.
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings were initially studied in the one-sided preference
lists model: here only one side of the bipartite instance has preferences over its neighbors. Popular
matchings need not always exist in this model and there is an efficient algorithm [1] to determine
if a given instance admits one. Popular mixed matchings always exist here [13] and such a mixed
matching can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming.
In the stable matching problem in bipartite instances (the two-sided preference lists model),
popular matchings always exist and a max-size popular matching can be computed efficiently [9,14].
These algorithms always compute dominant matchings — it was shown in [5] that dominant match-
ings are essentially stable matchings in a larger bipartite graph. When ties are allowed in preference
lists, the problem of deciding if a popular matching problem exists or not is NP-hard [2,4].
It was shown in [11] that the problem of computing a max-weight popular matching in a room-
mates instance with edge weights is NP-hard. This was strengthened in [16] to show that the problem
of computing a max-size popular matching in a roommates instance is NP-hard. An efficient algo-
rithm was also given in [16] to compute a strongly dominant matching in a roommates instance.
Strongly dominant matchings are a subclass of dominant matchings; interestingly, in bipartite in-
stances, dominant and strongly dominant are equivalent notions [14].
It was shown in [10] that every roommates instance G = (V,E) admits a matching whose
unpopularity factor is O(log |V |) and it is NP-hard to compute a least unpopularity matching in
G. The complexity of the popular roommates problem was stated as an open problem in several
papers/books [2,3,10,11,17].
Techniques. We use properties of popular matchings in bipartite instances here — in particular,
we use the LP framework of popular matchings that was initiated in [13]. Every popular matching
M in a bipartite instance H is a max-weight perfect matching in a related graph H˜ and an optimal
solution to the dual LP (dual to the max-weight perfect matching LP) is a witness to the popularity
of M . It is known that a matching in H is popular if and only if it has a witness α ∈ {0,±1}n,
where n is the number of vertices.
A stable matching in our roommates instance G will correspond to a matching in H with 0 as a
witness and a strongly dominant matching in G will correspond to a matching in H with a witness
α such that αu ∈ {±1} for all matched vertices u. We show a reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the
popular roommates problem via the problem of deciding if a desired popular matching exists in the
bipartite instance H; such a matching is constrained to have a certain witness in {0,±1}n which
will prove its hardness.
2
Organization of the paper. Section 2 contains an overview of the LP framework of popular matchings
in bipartite instances. Section 3 outlines the reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the popular roommates
problem and Section 4 has more details of our hardness reduction. Section 5 shows NP-hardness for
dominant matchings.
2 Preliminaries
This section is an overview of the LP framework of popular matchings in bipartite graphs from
[13] along with some results from [15,16]. Let H = (A ∪ B,EH) be a bipartite instance with strict
preference lists and let H˜ be the graph H augmented with self-loops, i.e., it is assumed that every
vertex is its own last choice. Let M be any matching in H. Corresponding to M , there is a perfect
matching M˜ in H˜ defined as follows: M˜ = M ∪ {(u, u) : u is left unmatched in M}.
We now define an edge weight function wtM in H˜. For any vertex u and neighbors v, v
′ in H˜, let
voteu(v, v
′) be 1 if u prefers v to v′, it is -1 if u prefers v′ to v, else it is 0 (i.e., v = v′). The function
wtM is defined as follows:
wtM (u, v) = voteu(v, M˜(u)) + votev(u, M˜(v)) for (u, v) ∈ EH .
Thus wtM (u, v) ∈ {0,±2}. We need to define wtM on self-loops as well: for any u ∈ V , let
wtM (u, u) = 0 if u is unmatched in M , else let wtM (u, u) = −1. Thus wtM (u, u) is u’s vote for itself
versus M˜(u).
It is easy to see that for any matching N in H, ∆(N,M) = wtM (N˜). Thus M is popular if and
only if every perfect matching in H˜ has weight at most 0. Let n = |A ∪B|.
Theorem 3 ([13]). Let M be any matching in H = (A ∪ B,EH). The matching M is popular if
and only if there exists a vector α ∈ Rn such that ∑u∈A∪B αu = 0 and
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ EH
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
The vector α will be an optimal solution to the LP that is dual to the max-weight perfect
matching LP in H˜ (with edge weight function wtM ). For any popular matching M , a vector α as
given in Theorem 3 will be called a witness to M . The following lemma will be useful to us.
Lemma 1 ([15]). Any popular matching in H = (A ∪B,EH) has a witness in {0,±1}n.
Call any e ∈ EH a popular edge if there is some popular matching in H that contains e. Let M
be a popular matching in H and let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M .
Lemma 2 ([16]). If (a, b) is a popular edge in H, then αa + αb = wtM (a, b). If u is an unstable
vertex in H then αu = 0 if u is left unmatched in M , else αu = −1.
The popular subgraph FH is a useful subgraph of H defined in [16].
Definition 3. The popular subgraph FH = (A∪B,EF ) is the subgraph of H = (A∪B,EH) whose
edge set EF is the set of popular edges in EH .
The graph FH need not be connected. Let C1, . . . , Ch be the various components in FH .
Lemma 3 ([16]). For any connected component Ci in FH , either αu = 0 for all vertices u ∈ Ci or
αu ∈ {±1} for all vertices u ∈ Ci. Moreover, if Ci contains one or more unstable vertices, either all
these unstable vertices are matched in M or none of them is matched in M .
The following definition marks the state of each connected component Ci in FH as “stable” or
“dominant” in α — this classification will be useful to us in our hardness reduction.
Definition 4. A connected component Ci in FH is in stable state in α if αu = 0 for all vertices
u ∈ Ci. Similarly, Ci in FH is in dominant state in α if αu ∈ {±1} for all vertices u ∈ Ci.
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3 Hardness of the popular roommates problem
Our reduction will be from 1-in-3 SAT. Recall that 1-in-3 SAT is the set of 3CNF formulas with no
negated variables such that there is a satisfying assignment that makes exactly one variable true in
each clause. Given an input formula φ, to determine if φ is 1-in-3 satisfiable or not is NP-hard [18].
We will now build a roommates instance G = (V,E). The vertex set V will consist of vertices in
4 levels: levels 0, 1, 2, and 3 along with 5 other vertices d0, d1, d2, d3, and z. The vertices d0, d1, d2, d3
form a gadget D (on the left of Fig. 1) described below. The vertex d0 will be the last choice neighbor
of vertex v for every v ∈ V \ {z}.
Vertices in V \ {d0, d1, d2, d3, z} are partitioned into gadgets that appear in some level i, for
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Every edge (u, v) in G where u, v are in V \ {d0, z} is either inside a gadget or
between 2 gadgets in consecutive levels. We describe these gadgets below.
Level 1 vertices. Every gadget in level 1 is a variable gadget. Corresponding to each variable Xi,
we will have the gadget on the right of Fig. 1. The preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget
corresponding to Xi are as follows:
xi : yi  y′i  z  · · · yi : xi  x′i  z  · · ·
x′i : yi  y′i  · · · y′i : xi  x′i  · · ·
The vertices in the gadget corresponding toXi are also adjacent to vertices in the “clause gadgets”
corresponding to Xi: these neighbors belong to the “· · · ” part of the preference lists. Note that the
order among the vertices in the “· · · ” part in the above preference lists does not matter. Also, d0 is
the last choice of each of the above vertices.
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Fig. 1. Each of d1, d2, d3 is a top choice neighbor for another vertex here and d0 is the last choice of
d1, d2, d3. On the right is the gadget corresponding to variable Xi: vertex preferences are indicated
on edges.
The gadget D. There will be 4 vertices d0, d1, d2, d3 that form the gadget D (see the left of Fig. 1).
The preferences of vertices in D are given below.
d1 : d2  d3  d0 d2 : d3  d1  d0
d3 : d1  d2  d0 d0 : d1  d2  d3  · · ·
The vertex d0 will be adjacent to all vertices in G other than z. The order of other neighbors in
d0’s preference list does not matter. Let c = Xi ∨ Xj ∨ Xk be a clause in φ. We will describe the
gadgets that correspond to c.
Level 0 vertices. There will be three level 0 gadgets, each on 4 vertices, corresponding to clause c.
See Fig. 2. We describe below the preference lists of the 4 vertices ac1, b
c
1, a
c
2, b
c
2 that belong to the
leftmost gadget. For the sake of readability, we have dropped the superscript c from these vertices.
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Fig. 2. Corresponding to clause c = Xi∨Xj ∨Xk we have the above 3 gadgets in level 0. The vertex
ac1’s second choice is y
′
j and b
c
1’s is x
′
k, similarly, a
c
3’s is y
′
k and b
c
3’s is x
′
i, also a
c
5’s is y
′
i and b
c
5’s is x
′
j .
a1 : b1  y′j  b2  z b1 : a2  x′k  a1  z
a2 : b2  b1 b2 : a1  a2
Though d0 is not explicitly listed in the above preference lists, recall that d0 is the last choice
of each of these vertices. Neighbors that are outside this gadget are underlined. The preferences of
vertices in the other 2 gadgets in level 0 corresponding to c (act , b
c
t for t = 3, 4 and a
c
t , b
c
t for t = 5, 6)
are analogous. We will now describe the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to clause c. See Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. We have the above 3 gadgets in level 2 corresponding to c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk . The vertex pc2’s
second choice is yj and q
c
2’s is xk, similarly, p
c
5’s is yk and q
c
5’s is xi, similarly p
c
8’s is yi and q
c
8’s is xj .
Level 2 vertices. There will be three level 2 gadgets, each on 6 vertices, corresponding to clause c.
The preference lists of the vertices pct , q
c
t for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 are described below. Also, d0 is the last choice
of each of these vertices. For the sake of readability, we have again dropped the superscript c from
these vertices.
p0 : q0  q2 q0 : p0  p2  z  s0
p1 : q1  q2  z q1 : p1  p2
p2 : q0  yj  q1  q2 q2 : p1  xk  p0  p2
Let us note the preference lists of p2 and q2: they are each other’s fourth choices. The vertex p2
regards q0 as its top choice, yj as its second choice, and q1 as its third choice. The vertex q2 regards
p1 as its top choice, xk as its second choice, and p0 as its third choice.
The preferences of vertices in the other 2 gadgets in level 2 corresponding to c (pct , q
c
t for 3 ≤ t ≤ 5
and pct , q
c
t for 6 ≤ t ≤ 8) are analogous to the above preference lists. The vertex s0 that appears in
q0’s preference list is a vertex from the level 3 gadget corresponding to clause c. Note that s0 also
appears in q3’s preference list and the vertex t0 appears in the preference lists of p4 and p7.
Level 3 vertices. Gadgets in level 3 are again clause gadgets. There is exactly one level 3 gadget on
8 vertices sci , t
c
i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, corresponding to clause c. As before, d0 is the last choice of each of
these vertices.
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s0 : t1  q0  t2  q3  t3 t0 : s3  p7  s2  p4  s1
s1 : t1  t0 t1 : s1  s0
s2 : t2  t0 t2 : s2  s0
s3 : t3  t0 t3 : s3  s0
The preference lists of the 8 vertices in the level 3 gadget corresponding to clause c are described
above. For the sake of readability, we have again dropped the superscript c from these vertices.
It is important to note the preference lists of s0 and t0 here. Among neighbors in this gadget,
s0’s order is t1  t2  t3 while t0’s order is s3  s2  s1. Also, s0’s order is interleaved with q0  q3
(these are vertices from level 2 gadgets) and t0’s order is interleaved with p7  p4.
There is one more vertex in G. This is the vertex z, the neighbors of z are ∪i{xi, yi} ∪c
{ac2i−1, bc2i−1 : i = 1, 2, 3} ∪c {pc3j+1, qc3j : j = 0, 1, 2}. The preference order of these neighbors in
z’s preference list is as follows:
z : x1  y1  · · ·  xn0  yn0  ac11  bc11  · · ·
Here n0 is the number of variables in φ. Note that z prefers any neighbor in a level 1 gadget to other
neighbors.
Thus the vertex set V is {z} ∪ {d0, d1, d2, d3} ∪3i=0 {level i vertices}. We will partition the set
∪3i=0{level i vertices} into X ∪ Y where
X = ∪i{xi, x′i} ∪c {ac1, . . . , ac6, pc0, . . . , pc8, sc0, . . . , sc3}
Y = ∪i{yi, y′i} ∪c {bc1, . . . , bc6, qc0, . . . , qc8, tc0, . . . , tc3}.
Lemma 4. For any popular matching M in G, the following properties hold:
(1) either {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} ⊂M or {(d0, d2), (d1, d3)} ⊂M .
(2) M matches all vertices in X ∪ Y .
Proof. Since each of d1, d2, d3 is a top choice neighbor for some vertex in G, a popular matching in
G cannot leave any of these 3 vertices unmatched. Since these 3 vertices have no neighbors outside
themselves other than d0, a popular matching has to match d0 to one of d1, d2, d3. Thus d0, d1, d2, d3
are matched among each other in M .
The only possibilities for M when restricted to d0, d1, d2, d3 are the pair of edges (d0, d1), (d2, d3)
or (d0, d2), (d1, d3). The third possibility (d0, d3), (d1, d2) is “less popular than” (d0, d1), (d2, d3) as
d0, d2, and d3 prefer the latter to the former. This proves part (1) of the lemma.
Consider any vertex v ∈ X ∪ Y . If v is left unmatched in M then we either have an alternating
path ρ1 = (v, d0)-(d0, d1)-(d1, d3) or an alternating path ρ2 = (v, d0)-(d0, d2)-(d2, d1) with respect
to M : in each of these alternating paths, the starting vertex v is unmatched in M , the middle edge
belongs to M , and the third edge is a blocking edge with respect to M .
Suppose ρ1 is an alternating path with respect to M . Consider M ⊕ ρ1 versus M : the vertices
v, d1, d3 prefer M ⊕ ρ1 to M while d0 and d2 prefer M to M ⊕ ρ1; the other vertices are indifferent
between M and M ⊕ ρ1. Thus M ⊕ ρ1 is more popular than M , a contradiction to M ’s popularity.
Similarly, if ρ2 is an alternating path with respect to M then M⊕ρ2 is more popular than M . Hence
every vertex in X ∪ Y has to be matched in M . This proves part (2). uunionsq
Since the total number of vertices in G is odd, at least 1 vertex has to be left unmatched in any
matching in G. Lemma 4 implies that the vertex z will be left unmatched in M .
Let G0 be the subgraph of G induced on X ∪ Y ∪ {z}. The matching M restricted to G0 has to
be popular on G0, otherwise it would contradict the popularity of M in G. We will now show the
following converse of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. If G0 admits a popular matching that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y then G admits a
popular matching.
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Proof. Let M0 be a popular matching in G0 that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y . We claim M =
M0 ∪ {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} is a popular matching in G.
Let G′0 be the subgraph obtained by removing all negative
2 edges to M0 from G0. Since M0
is popular in G0, it satisfies the following three necessary and sufficient conditions for popularity
(from [9]) in G′0.
1. There is no alternating cycle that contains a blocking edge.
2. There is no alternating path with z as an endpoint that contains a blocking edge.
3. There is no alternating path that contains two blocking edges.
We need to show that M obeys the above 3 conditions in the subgraph G′ obtained by deleting
negative edges to M from G. The graph G′ is the graph G′0 along with some edges within the gadget
D. There is no edge in G′ between D and any vertex in G0 since every edge in G between D and a
vertex in G0 is negative to M . This is because for any such edge (d0, v), the vertex d0 prefers d1 (its
partner in M) to v and similarly, v prefers each of its neighbors in G0 to d0. Since v ∈ X ∪ Y , note
that M0 matches v to one of its neighbors in G0.
It is easy to check that the edge set {(d0, d1), (d2, d3)} satisfies the above 3 conditions in the
subgraph of D obtained by pruning negative edges to M . We know that M0 satisfies the above 3
conditions in G′0. Thus M satisfies the above 3 conditions in G
′. Hence M is popular in G. uunionsq
We will show the following theorem in Section 4.
Theorem 4. G0 admits a popular matching that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y if and only if φ is
1-in-3 satisfiable.
Since G admits a popular matching if and only if the instance G0 admits a popular matching
that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y , Theorem 4 implies the NP-hardness of the popular matching
problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E). Thus we can conclude Theorem 1 stated in Section 1.
4 Proof of Theorem 4
Our goal now is to use the LP framework for bipartite matchings from Section 2. However the graph
G0 is non-bipartite. This is due to the presence of the vertex z. So let us convert the graph G0 on
vertex set X ∪ Y ∪ {z} into a bipartite instance H by splitting the vertex z into 2 vertices z and z′.
That is, every occurrence of z in the preference lists of vertices in Y will be replaced by z′.
Thus H = (X ′ ∪ Y ′, EH) where X ′ = X ∪ {z′} and Y ′ = Y ∪ {z}. The edge set EH of H is
the same as the edge set of G0, except that each edge (z, v) where v ∈ Y gets replaced by the edge
(z′, v) in H.
The graph H is a bipartite graph with X ∪ {z′} on the left and Y ∪ {z} on the right. The
preference list of z (similarly, z′) is the original preference list of z restricted to neighbors in X
(resp., Y ). The vertices of H \{z, z′} are level i vertices in G, for i = 0, . . . , 3. Let FH be the popular
subgraph of H.
Lemma 6. Let C be any level i gadget in H, where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. All the vertices in C belong to
the same connected component in FH .
Proof. Consider a level 0 gadget in H, say on ac1, b
c
1, a
c
2, b
c
2. The “men-optimal” (or X
′-optimal) stable
matching in H contains the edges (ac1, b
c
1) and (a
c
2, b
c
2) while the “women-optimal” (or Y
′-optimal)
stable matching contains the edges (ac1, b
c
2) and (a
c
2, b
c
1). Thus there are popular edges among these
4 vertices and so these 4 vertices belong to the same connected component in FH .
Consider a level 1 gadget in H, say on xi, yi, x
′
i, y
′
i. A stable matching in H contains (xi, yi) and
(x′i, y
′
i) while a dominant matching in H contains (xi, y
′
i) and (x
′
i, yi). Thus there are popular edges
among these 4 vertices and so these 4 vertices belong to the same connected component in FH .
2 An edge (u, v) is negative to M0 if both u and v prefer their assignments in M0 over each other.
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Consider a level 2 gadget in H, say on pci , q
c
i for i = 0, 1, 2. There is a dominant matching in
H that contains the edges (pc0, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
0). There is also another dominant matching in H that
contains the edges (pc1, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
1). Thus there are popular edges among these 6 vertices and so
these 6 vertices belong to the same connected component in FH .
Consider a level 3 gadget in H, say on sci , t
c
i for i = 0, . . . , 3. There is a dominant matching in H
that contains (sc0, t
c
1), and (s
c
1, t
c
0). There is another dominant matching in H that contains (s
c
0, t
c
2)
and (sc2, t
c
0). There is yet another dominant matching in H that contains (s
c
0, t
c
3) and (s
c
3, t
c
0). Thus
there are popular edges among these 8 vertices and so these 8 vertices belong to the same connected
component in FH . uunionsq
The lemma below shows that no edge between a level ` vertex and a level (`+ 1) vertex is used
in any popular matching in H, for ` ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Lemma 7. There is no popular edge in H between a level ` vertex and a level ` + 1 vertex for
` ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Proof. Let c = Xi∪Xj∪Xk be a clause in φ. We will first show that no edge between a level 0 vertex
and a level 1 vertex can be popular. Consider any such edge in H, say (ac1, y
′
j). In order to show
this edge cannot be present in a popular matching, we will show a popular matching S along with
a witness α such that αac1 + αy′j > wtS(a
c
1, y
′
j). Then it will immediately follow from the slackness
of this edge that (ac1, y
′
j) does not belong to any popular matching (by Lemma 2).
Let S be the men-optimal stable matching. The vector α = 0 is a witness to S. The edges
(ac1, b
c
1) and (x
′
j , y
′
j) belong to S, so we have wt(a
c
1, y
′
j) = −2 while αac1 = αy′j = 0. Thus (ac1, y′j) is
not a popular edge. We can similarly show that (x′k, b
c
1) is not a popular edge by considering the
women-optimal stable matching S′.
We will now show that no edge between a level 1 vertex and a level 2 vertex is popular. Consider
any such edge in H, say (pc2, yj). Consider the dominant matching N that contains the edges (p
c
0, q
c
2)
and (pc2, q
c
0). All dominant matchings in H contain the edges (xj , y
′
j) and (x
′
j , yj).
Any witness β to N sets βpc2 = βqc2 = −1 and βxj = βyj = 1. This is because (xj , yj) and (pc0, qc0)
are blocking edges to N , so βxj = βyj = 1 and similarly, βpc0 = βqc0 = 1 (this makes βpc2 = βqc2 = −1).
Consider the edge (pc2, yj). We have wtN (p
c
2, yj) = −2 while βpc2 + βyj = 0. Thus this edge is slack
and so it cannot be a popular edge. We can similarly show that the edge (xk, q
c
2) is not popular by
considering the dominant matching N ′ that includes the edges (pc1, q
c
2) and (p
c
2, q
c
1).
We will now show that no edge between a level 2 vertex and a level 3 vertex is popular. Consider
any such edge in H, say (sc0, q
c
0). Consider the dominant matching T that includes the edges (s
c
0, t
c
1)
and (sc1, t
c
0). Here q
c
0 is matched either to p
c
0 or to p
c
2. In both cases, we have wtT (s
c
0, q
c
0) = −2 while
γsc0 = −1 and γqc0 = 1, where γ is a witness to the matching T . Hence (sc0, qc0) is not a popular edge.
It can similarly be shown for any edge e between a level 2 vertex and a level 3 vertex in H that e is
not a popular edge. uunionsq
4.1 Desired popular matchings in H
It is simple to see that M is a popular matching in G0 that matches all vertices in X ∪Y and leaves
z unmatched if and only if M is a popular matching in H that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y and
leaves z and z′ unmatched. We will call such a matching M in H a “desired popular matching” here.
Let M be such a matching and let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M , where n = |X ′ ∪ Y ′|.
The following two observations will be important for us. Recall Definition 4 from Section 2.
1. All level 3 gadgets have to be in dominant state in α.
2. All level 0 gadgets have to be in stable state in α.
The vertices sc0 and t
c
0, for all clauses c, are left unmatched in any stable matching in H. Since M
has to match the unstable vertices sc0 and t
c
0 for all clauses c, αsc0 = αtc0 = −1 for all c (by Lemma 2).
Thus the first observation follows from Lemma 3. We prove the second observation below.
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Claim. Any level 0 gadget has to be in stable state in α.
Proof. Consider any level 0 gadget, say on vertices ac3, b
c
3, a
c
4, b
c
4. Since M is a popular matching, we
have αac3 + αz ≥ wtM (ac3, z) and αz′ + αbc3 ≥ wtM (z′, bc3). Since z and z′ are unmatched in M , it
follows from Lemma 2 that αz = αz′ = 0. We also have wtM (a
c
3, z) = 0 since z prefers a
c
3 to being
unmatched while ac3 likes any of its neighbors in Y (one of them is its partner in M) to z. Similarly,
wtM (z
′, bc3) = 0. Thus αac3 ≥ 0 and similarly, αbc3 ≥ 0.
The edge (ac3, b
c
3) is a popular edge. Thus αac3 + αbc3 = wtM (a
c
3, b
c
3) (by Lemma 2). Observe that
wtM (a
c
3, b
c
3) = 0 since either (a
c
3, b
c
3) ∈ M or (ac3, bc4), (ac4, bc3) are in M . Thus αac3 + αbc3 = 0. Since
αac3 and αbc3 are non-negative, it follows that αac3 = αbc3 = 0. Thus this gadget is in stable state in
α. uunionsq
The following lemmas are easy to show and are crucial to our NP-hardness proof. Let c =
Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk be any clause in φ. In our proofs below, we are omitting the superscript c from vertex
names for the sake of readability. Recall that α ∈ {0,±1}n is a witness of our desired popular
matching M .
Lemma 8. For every clause c in φ, at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c have
to be in dominant state in α.
Proof. Let c be any clause in φ. We know from observation 1 that the level 3 gadget corresponding
to c is in dominant state in α. So αs0 = αt0 = −1. Also, one of the following three cases holds:
(1) (s0, t1) and (s1, t0) are in M , (2) (s0, t2) and (s2, t0) are in M , (3) (s0, t3) and (s3, t0) are in M .
– In case (1), the vertex t0 prefers p4 and p7 to its partner s1 inM . Thus wtM (p4, t0) = wtM (p7, t0) =
0. Since αt0 = −1, we need to have αp4 = αp7 = 1 so that αp4 + αt0 ≥ wtM (p4, t0) and
αp7 + αt0 ≥ wtM (p7, t0). Thus the middle and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see
Fig. 3) have to be in dominant state in α.
– In case (2), the vertex t0 prefers p7 to its partner s2 in M and the vertex s0 prefers q0 to its
partner t2 in M . Thus αp7 = αq0 = 1 so that αp7+αt0 ≥ wtM (p7, t0) and αs0+αq0 ≥ wtM (s0, q0).
Thus the leftmost and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3) have to be in
dominant state in α.
– In case (3), the vertex s0 prefers q0 and q3 to its partner t3 in M . Thus αq0 = αq3 = 1 so that
αs0 + αq0 ≥ wtM (s0, q0) and αs0 + αq3 ≥ wtM (s0, q3). Thus the leftmost and middle level 2
gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3) have to be in dominant state in α. uunionsq
Lemma 9. For any clause c in φ, at least one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in
c is in dominant state in α.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 8 that at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c are
in dominant state in α. Assume without loss of generality that these are the leftmost gadget and
middle gadget (see Fig. 3).
In particular, we know from the proof of Lemma 8 that αq0 = αq3 = 1. This also forces αp1 =
αp4 = 1. This is because αp1 and αp4 have to be non-negative since p1 and p4 are neighbors of the
unmatched vertex z.
As q0 and p1 are the most preferred neighbors of p2 and q2, we have wtM (p2, q0) = wtM (p1, q2) =
0. Since (p2, q0) and (p1, q2) are popular edges, it follows from Lemma 2 that αp2 = αq2 = −1. Thus
either (i) (p2, q0) and (p0, q2) are in M or (ii) (p2, q1) and (p1, q2) are in M . This means that either
wtM (p2, yj) = 0 or wtM (xk, q2) = 0. That is, either αyj = 1 or αxk = 1.
Similarly, wtM (p5, q3) = wtM (p4, q5) = 0 and we can conclude that αp5 = αq5 = −1. Thus
either (i) (p5, q3) and (p3, q5) are in M or (ii) (p5, q4) and (p4, q5) are in M . This means that either
wtM (p5, yk) = 0 or wtM (xi, q5) = 0. That is, either αyk = 1 or αxi = 1.
Thus either (i) the gadgets corresponding to variables Xi and Xj are in dominant state or
(ii) the gadget corresponding to Xk is in dominant state in α. Thus at least one of the level 1
gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in dominant state in α. uunionsq
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Lemma 10. For any clause c in φ, at most one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in
c is in dominant state in α.
Proof. We know from observation 2 made at the start of this section that all the three level 0 gadgets
corresponding to c are in stable state in α. So αat = αbt = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 6. Either (i) (a1, b1) and
(a2, b2) are in M or (ii) (a1, b2) and (a2, b1) are in M . So either wtM (a1, y
′
j) = 0 or wtM (x
′
k, b1) = 0.
So either αy′j ≥ 0 or αx′k ≥ 0.
Consider any variable Xr. Either {(xr, y′r), (x′r, yr)} ⊂ M or {(xr, yr), (x′r, y′r)} ⊂ M . It follows
from Lemma 2 that αxr +αy′r = wtM (xr, y
′
r) = 0 and αx′r +αyr = wtM (x
′
r, yr) = 0. Also due to the
vertices z and z′, we have αxr ≥ 0 and αyr ≥ 0. Thus αy′r ≤ 0 and αx′r ≤ 0.
Hence we can conclude that either αy′j = 0 or αx′k = 0. In other words, either the gadget
corresponding to Xj or the gadget corresponding to Xk is in stable state. Similarly, by analyzing
the level 0 gadget on vertices at, bt for t = 3, 4, we can show that either the gadget corresponding
to Xk or the gadget corresponding to Xi is in stable state. Also, by analyzing the level 0 gadget on
vertices at, bt for t = 5, 6, either the gadget corresponding to Xi or the gadget corresponding to Xj
is in stable state.
Thus at least two of the three level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in clause c are in stable
state in α. Hence at most one of these three gadgets is in dominant state in α. uunionsq
Lemma 11. If H admits a desired popular matching then φ has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
Proof. Let M be a desired popular matching in H. That is, M matches all in X ∪Y and leaves z, z′
unmatched. Let α ∈ {0,±1}n be a witness of M .
We will now define a true/false assignment for the variables in φ. For each variable Xr in φ do:
– set Xr to true if its level 1 gadget is in dominant state in α, i.e., if αxr = αyr = 1 or equivalently,
(xr, y
′
r) and (x
′
r, yr) are in M .
– else set Xr to false, i.e., here αxr = αyr = 0 or equivalently, (xr, yr) and (x
′
r, y
′
r) are in M .
Since M is our desired popular matching, it follows from Lemmas 9 and 10 that for every clause
c in φ, exactly one of the three level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in dominant state
in α. That is, for each clause c in φ, exactly one of the three variables in c is set to true. uunionsq
4.2 The converse
Suppose φ admits a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment. We will now use this assignment to construct a
desired popular matching M in H. For each variable Xr in φ do:
– if Xr = true then include the edges (xr, y
′
r) and (x
′
r, yr) in M ;
– else include the edges (xr, yr) and (x
′
r, y
′
r) in M .
Consider a clause c = Xi ∨Xj ∨Xk. We know that exactly one of Xi, Xj , Xk is set to true in our
assignment. Assume without loss of generality that Xj = true.
We will include the following edges in M from all the gadgets corresponding to c. Corresponding
to the level 0 gadgets for c (see Fig. 2), we do:
– Add the edges (ac1, b
c
1), (a
c
2, b
c
2) from the leftmost gadget and (a
c
5, b
c
6), (a
c
6, b
c
5) from the rightmost
gadget to M .
We will select (ac3, b
c
3), (a
c
4, b
c
4) from the middle gadget. (Note that we could also have selected
(ac3, b
c
4), (a
c
4, b
c
3) from the middle gadget.)
Corresponding to the level 2 gadgets for c (see Fig. 3), we do:
– Add the edges (pc0, q
c
0), (p
c
1, q
c
2), (p
c
2, q
c
1) from the leftmost gadget, (p
c
3, q
c
3), (p
c
4, q
c
4), (p
c
5, q
c
5) from
the middle gadget, and (pc6, q
c
8), (p
c
7, q
c
7), (p
c
8, q
c
6) from the rightmost gadget to M .
Since the leftmost and rightmost level 2 gadgets (see Fig. 3) are dominant, we will include (sc0, t
c
2)
and (sc2, t
c
0) in M . Hence
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– Add the edges (sc0, t
c
2), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
0), (s
c
3, t
c
3) to M .
We will show the following theorem now.
Theorem 5. The matching M described above is a popular matching.
Proof. We will proveM ’s popularity by describing a witnessα ∈ {0,±1}n. That is,∑u∈X′∪Y ′ αu will
be 0 and every edge will be covered by the sum of α-values of its endpoints, i.e., αu+αv ≥ wtM (u, v)
for all edges (u, v) in H. We will also have αu ≥ wtM (u, u) for all vertices u.
Set αz = αz′ = 0. Also set αu = 0 for all vertices u in gadgets that are in stable state. That is,
there are no blocking edges to M in these gadgets. This includes all level 0 gadgets, and the gadgets
in level 1 that correspond to variables set to false, and also the level 2 gadgets in stable state, i.e.,
such as the gadget with vertices pc3, q
c
3, p
c
4, q
c
4, p
c
5, q
c
5 (the middle gadget in Fig. 3) since we assumed
Xj = true.
For every variable Xr assigned to true: set αxr = αyr = 1 and αx′r = αy′r = −1. For every clause,
consider the level 2 gadgets corresponding to this clause that are in dominant state: for our clause
c, these are the leftmost and rightmost gadgets in Fig. 3 (since we assumed Xj = true).
Recall that we included in M the edges (pc0, q
c
0), (p
c
1, q
c
2), (p
c
2, q
c
1) from the leftmost gadget. We
will set αqc0 = αpc1 = αqc1 = 1 and αpc0 = αpc2 = αqc2 = −1. We also included in M the edges
(pc6, q
c
8), (p
c
7, q
c
7), (p
c
8, q
c
6) from the rightmost gadget. We will set αpc6 = αqc6 = αpc7 = 1 and αqc7 =
αpc8 = αqc8 = −1.
In the level 3 gadget corresponding to c, we included the edges (sc0, t
c
2), (s
c
1, t
c
1), (s
c
2, t
c
0), (s
c
3, t
c
3) in
M . We will set αtc1 = αsc2 = αtc2 = αsc3 = 1 and αsc0 = αtc0 = αsc1 = αtc3 = −1.
The claim below shows that α is indeed a valid witness to M . Thus M is a popular matching. uunionsq
Claim. The vector α defined above is a witness to M .
Proof. For any edge (u, v) ∈M , we have αu +αv = 0, thus
∑
u∈X′∪Y ′ αu = 0. For any neighbor v of
z or z′, we have αv ≥ 0. Thus all edges incident to z or z′ are covered by the sum of α-values of their
endpoints. It is also easy to see that for every intra-gadget edge (u, v), we have αu+αv ≥ wtM (u, v).
In particular, the endpoints of every blocking edge to M have their α-value set to 1. When Xj = true,
in the gadgets involving clause c, (xj , yj), (p
c
1, q
c
1), (p
c
6, q
c
6), (s
c
2, t
c
2) are blocking edges to M .
So we will now check that the edge covering constraint holds for all edges (u, v) where u and v
belong to different levels. Consider edges in H between a level 0 gadget and a level 1 gadget. When
Xj = true, the edges (a
c
1, y
′
j) and (x
′
j , b
c
5) are most interesting as they have one endpoint in a gadget
in stable state and another endpoint in a gadget in dominant state.
Observe that both these edges are negative to M . This is because ac1 prefers its partner b
c
1 to y
′
j
and y′j prefers its partner xj to a
c
1. Thus wtM (a
c
1, y
′
j) = −2 < αac1 +αy′j = 0− 1. Similarly, bc5 prefers
its partner ac6 to x
′
j and x
′
j prefers its partner yj to b
c
5. Thus wtM (x
′
j , b
c
5) = −2 < αx′j +αbc5 = −1+0.
We will now consider edges in H between a level 1 gadget and a level 2 gadget. We have
wtM (p
c
2, yj) = 0 since p
c
2 prefers yj to its partner q
c
1 while yj prefers its partner x
′
j to p
c
2. We
have αpc2 +αyj = −1+1 = wtM (pc2, yj) = 0. The edge (xk, qc2) is negative to M and so this is covered
by the sum of α-values of its endpoints. Similarly, (pc8, yi) is negative to M while wtM (xj , q
c
8) = 0 =
1 − 1 = αxj + αqc8 . We have wtM (pc5, yk) = 0 and αpc5 = αyk = 0. Similarly, wtM (xi, qc5) = 0 and
αxi = αqc5 = 0. Thus all these edges are covered.
We will now consider edges in H between a level 2 gadget and a level 3 gadget. These edges
are (sc0, q
c
0), (s
c
0, q
c
3), (p
c
7, t
c
0), (p
c
4, t
c
0). We have wtM (s
c
0, q
c
0) = 0 and αsc0 = −1, αqc0 = 1, so this edge
is covered. Similarly, wtM (p
c
7, t
c
0) = 0 and αpc7 = 1, αtc0 = −1. The edges (sc0, qc3) and (pc4, tc0) are
negative to M , so they are also covered. Thus it can be checked that α is a witness for M . uunionsq
Thus H admits a desired popular matching if and only if φ has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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5 Dominant matchings
Recall that a popular matching M is dominant if M is more popular than every larger matching.
Observe that every popular matching M in our roommates instance G = (V,E) is a max-size
matching: this is because M matches all vertices in G except the vertex z (by Lemma 4). Thus every
popular matching in G is dominant and so it follows from Theorem 1 that the dominant matching
problem in G is NP-hard.
Note that the instance G does not admit a stable matching. This is due to the gadget D =
{d0, d1, d2, d3}. However the instance G0 = G \D admits stable matchings. It is easy to see that a
stable matching in G0 matches all vertices in X ∪ Y except the vertices sc0, tc0 for all clauses c.
Lemma 12. A popular matching N in G0 is dominant if and only the set of vertices matched in N
is X ∪ Y .
Proof. Let N be any popular matching in G0. Any popular matching has to match all stable vertices
in G0 (those matched in any stable matching) [9], thus N matches all stable vertices in G0. Suppose
some unstable vertex in X ∪ Y (say, sc0) is left unmatched in N . We claim that tc0 also has to be
left unmatched in N . Since sc1 and t
c
1 have no other neighbors, the edge (s
c
1, t
c
1) ∈ N and so there
is an augmenting path ρ = sc0-t
c
1-s
c
1-t
c
0 with respect to N . Observe that N is not more popular than
N ⊕ ρ, a larger matching. Thus N is not a dominant matching in G0.
In order to justify that tc0 also has to be left unmatched in N , let us view N as a popular matching
in H. We know that sc0 and t
c
0 belong to the same connected component in the popular subgraph
FH (by Lemma 6). So if s
c
0 is left unmatched in N , then t
c
0 is also unmatched in N (by Lemma 3).
Conversely, suppose N is a popular matching in G0 that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y . Then
there is no larger matching than N in G0 and thus N is a dominant matching. uunionsq
Thus a dominant matching exists in G0 if and only if there is a popular matching in G0 that
matches all vertices in X∪Y . Hence it follows from Theorem 4 that the dominant matching problem
is NP-hard even in roommates instances that admit stable matchings. Thus Theorem 2 stated in
Section 1 follows.
References
1. D.J. Abraham, R.W. Irving, T. Kavitha, and K. Mehlhorn. Popular matchings. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 37(4): 1030–1045, 2007.
2. P. Biro, R. W. Irving, and D. F. Manlove. Popular Matchings in the Marriage and Roommates Problems.
In the 7th International Conference in Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC): 97–108, 2010. (Technical
Report TR-2009-306, University of Glasgow, 2009)
3. A´. Cseh. Popular Matchings. In Trends in Computational Social Choice, Edited by Ulle Endriss, COST
(European Cooperation in Science and Technology): 105–122, 2017.
4. A´. Cseh, C.-C. Huang, and T. Kavitha. Popular matchings with two-sided preferences and one-sided
ties. In the 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP):
Part I, 367–379, 2015.
5. A´. Cseh and T. Kavitha. Popular edges and dominant matchings. In the 18th International Conference
on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO): 138–151, 2016.
6. D. Gale and L.S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical
Monthly, 69(1): 9–15, 1962.
7. P. Ga¨rdenfors. Match making: assignments based on bilateral preferences. Behavioural Sciences,
20(3): 166–173, 1975.
8. S. Gupta, P. Misra, S. Saurabh, and M. Zehavi. Popular Matching in Roommates Setting is NP-hard.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.09370.pdf
9. C.-C. Huang and T. Kavitha. Popular matchings in the stable marriage problem. Information and
Computation, 222: 180–194, 2013.
10. C.-C. Huang and T. Kavitha. Near-Popular Matchings in the Roommates Problem. SIAM Journal on
Discrete Mathematics, 27(1): 43–62, 2013.
11. C.-C. Huang and T. Kavitha. Popularity, Self-Duality, and Mixed matchings. In the 28th ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA): 2294-2310, 2017.
12
12. R. W. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the stable roommates problem. Journal of Algorithms, 6: 577–595,
1985.
13. T. Kavitha, J. Mestre, and M. Nasre. Popular mixed matchings. Theoretical Computer Science,
412(24): 2679–2690, 2011.
14. T. Kavitha. A size-popularity tradeoff in the stable marriage problem. SIAM Journal on Computing,
43(1): 52–71, 2014.
15. T. Kavitha. Popular half-integral matchings. In the 43rd International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages, and Programming (ICALP): 22.1-22.13, 2016.
16. T. Kavitha. Max-size popular matchings and extensions. http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.07440
17. D. J. Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences. World Scientific, 2013.
18. T. J. Schaefer. The complexity of satisfiability problems. In the 10th Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, 216–226, 1978.
19. A. Subramanian. A new approach to stable matching problems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 23(4): 671–
700, 1994.
20. J. J. M. Tan. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching.
Journal of Algorithms, 12: 154–178, 1991.
21. C.-P. Teo and J. Sethuraman. The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 23(4): 874–891, 1998.
13
